SCLib: A practical and lightweight defense against component hijacking in android applications by WU, Daoyuan et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
3-2018
SCLib: A practical and lightweight defense against
component hijacking in android applications
Daoyuan WU
Singapore Management University, dywu.2015@phdis.smu.edu.sg
Yao CHENG
Institute of Infocomm Research
Debin GAO
Singapore Management University, dbgao@smu.edu.sg
Yingjiu LI
Singapore Management University, yjli@smu.edu.sg
Robert H. DENG
Singapore Management University, robertdeng@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3176258.3176336
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Information Security Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WU, Daoyuan; CHENG, Yao; GAO, Debin; LI, Yingjiu; and DENG, Robert H.. SCLib: A practical and lightweight defense against
component hijacking in android applications. (2018). CODASPY '18: Proceedings of 8th ACM Conference on Data and Application
Security and Privacy, Tempe, AZ, March 19-21. 299-306. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4088
SCLib: A Practical and Lightweight Defense against Component
Hijacking in Android Applications
This is the extended technical report version of our SCLib paper in ACM CODASPY 2018 [56].
Daoyuan Wu
School of Information Systems,
Singapore Management University
dywu.2015@smu.edu.sg
Yao Cheng∗
Institute for Infocomm Research,
A*STAR, Singapore
cheng_yao@i2r.a-star.edu.sg
Debin Gao, Yingjiu Li, and
Robert H. Deng
School of Information Systems,
Singapore Management University
{dbgao,yjli,robertdeng}@smu.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
Cross-app collaboration via inter-component communication is a
fundamental mechanism on Android. Although it brings the ben-
efits such as functionality reuse and data sharing, a threat called
component hijacking is also introduced. By hijacking a vulnerable
component in victim apps, an attack app can escalate its privilege
for operations originally prohibited. Many prior studies have been
performed to understand and mitigate this issue, but no defense is
being deployed in the wild, largely due to the deployment difficul-
ties and performance concerns. In this paper we present SCLib, a
secure component library that performs in-app mandatory access
control on behalf of app components. It does not require firmware
modification or app repackaging as in previous works. The library-
based nature also makes SCLib more accessible to app developers,
and enables them produce secure components in the first place
over fragmented Android devices. As a proof of concept, we de-
sign six mandatory policies and overcome unique implementation
challenges to mitigate attacks originated from both system weak-
nesses and common developer mistakes. Our evaluation using ten
high-profile open source apps shows that SCLib can protect their
35 risky components with negligible code footprint (less than 0.3%
stub code) and nearly no slowdown to normal intra-app commu-
nications. The worst-case performance overhead to stop attacks is
about 5%.
1 INTRODUCTION
Android has been the dominant player in smartphone markets in
the last few years. On Android, different apps collaborate with each
other via inter-component communication [28]. Although such
flexible cross-app collaboration brings the benefits of functionality
reuse and data sharing, component hijacking [40] is also introduced
in which an attack app hijacks a vulnerable component in victim
apps to bypass Android sandbox and escalate its privilege [26], caus-
ing confused deputy problems [34] such as permission misuse [33],
data manipulation [40], and content leaks [64].
Many approaches have been proposed to mitigate component hi-
jacking. One major line of the research [16, 20, 21, 27, 31, 38, 48, 61]
is to modify and extend the Android operating system to supervise
inter-component communication. The other direction [62] is to
patch app binaries with repackaging [59]. Both are useful if they
∗Work by this author was performed while at Singapore Management University.
could be deployed in the wild, but nearly no proposal1 has been
integrated into Android or adopted by Google Play to date, largely
due to the compatibility and performance concerns. For example,
repackaging violates Android’s app verification mechanism and
thus is not favorable by app markets and developers who own the
source code. Consequently, component hijacking remains a serious
open problem in the Android ecosystem. As one of our contribu-
tions, we make a comprehensive comparison on existing defenses
in §3.2.
Key idea. In this paper, we provide a new perspective to prac-
tically defending against component hijacking. Our solution is a
secure component library, shorted as SCLib, which performs in-app
mandatory access control on behalf of app components. Due to its
library-based nature, SCLib requires neither firmware modification
nor app repackaging, significantly reducing the deployment difficul-
ties. Specifically, we propose two deployment models as shown in
Figure 1, the developer-driven and the end user-driven deployment.
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3. Push app updates 
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(a) Developer-driven deployment via regular app updates.
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(b) End user-driven deployment via Boxify [18].
Figure 1: Two deployment models of SCLib.
Deployment models. SCLib can be compiled by app develop-
ers into their original apps in their regular app updates (e.g., for
1Only SEAndroid [51] was adopted to replace the Linux UID-based sandbox
with the SELinux-confined sandbox [13].
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functionality improvement), which are then pushed to user devices
and automatically installed by Google Play. This deployment model
introduces minimal burden to developers because they have al-
ready accumulated experiences to integrate third-party libraries
such as OkHttp [12] and advertisement libraries. Further, SCLib
can help developers secure their apps in the first place (rather than
applying patches after apps have been released) over fragmented
Android devices [2] (a major limitation of firmware modification
approaches).
To further enable end users to secure their apps directly, we
envision the second deployment model through state-of-the-art
app sandboxing technology, e.g., Boxify, which sandboxes any other
app into its own process space and delegates their inter-component
communication via a reference monitor called Broker. Note that
Boxify does not require root privilege, firmware modification, or
app repackaging.We refer interested readers to [18] for more details.
As shown in Figure 1(b), SCLib can be plugged into Boxify as part
of its policy module or its shim code in each isolated app. Since
SCLib’s design is generally the same for both deployment models,
we present it under the first deployment in the rest of this paper.
SCLib design. As a major component of SCLib, we devise a set
of practical in-app policies to defend against component hijacking.
Our policy checking is based on enforcement primitives that previ-
ous efforts have not fully leveraged, including various component
attributes and input data of incoming requests. SCLib automatically
collects these primitives at entry points of the protected compo-
nents, and enforces “just-enough” policies from the pre-defined
policy set. As a proof of concept, we design six mandatory poli-
cies that either directly deny illegal requests or alert users via a
pop-up dialog for suspicious requests. These policies can mitigate
component hijacking originated from both system weaknesses and
common developer mistakes, half of which have not been tackled
by previous efforts. Moreover, we design SCLib to cover all four
types of components for the first time (see §3.2).
In the course of implementing SCLib, we identify and overcome
three major challenges that are unique in our context. First, An-
droid currently fails to provide the caller identity information to
most callee components, as explained in [16]. This caller identity,
however, is essential in implementing our mandatory access control
policies. Unlike the previous solution [16] that modifies Android
source code, SCLib leverages the Binder side channel to recover
caller app identities at the application layer (see §4.4). Second, it
is nearly infeasible to pop up alert dialog in the intercepted com-
ponents due to the lack of appropriate user interface context and
limited function return timing thresholds. We solve this problem by
a novel dialog-like Activity transition technique, which overcomes
both context and timing restrictions while maintaining user experi-
ence and policy enforcement logic (see §4.5). Third, there is lack of
API support to collect certain component attributes (e.g., whether
an exported component is explicitly or implicitly exported). SCLib
performs runtime Android manifest analysis by itself (see §4.6).
SCLib is a lightweight solution by design. It enforces policy
checking only at the entry points, and thus has no additional over-
head of information flow tracking that is required in some existing
approaches, e.g., AppSealer [62]. In addition, SCLib only affects
Android framework and kernel 
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caller app 
Attack 
component 
IPC request/flow 
Victim 
callee app 
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Figure 2: The threat model of component hijacking.
the performance of certain exported components that require pro-
tection. In contrast, hooking-based checking, e.g., Aurasium [59],
adds overhead to both exported and non-exported components.
Firmware modification approaches introduce overhead to all inter-
and intra-app communications in all apps within the system.
Evaluation. We evaluate SCLib using ten high-profile open
source apps. We show that these well-tested apps contain 35 risky
components that SCLib can contribute more protection. Our mea-
surement further finds that SCLib introduces negligible code foot-
print — less than 0.3% stub code in all cases. Furthermore, by
performing eight detailed security case studies, we demonstrate
SCLib’s unique values as compared to developers’ own patches
and Android platform updates. Finally, our performance evalua-
tion shows that SCLib incurs modest overhead to those protected
components (no overhead at all to other components).
The remainder of this paper is as follows. We first introduce the
threat model in §2, outline the objectives and analyze existing solu-
tions in §3. The design and implementation of SCLib are presented
in §4. In §5, we evaluate SCLib’s efficacy and efficiency, followed
by a discussion in §6. Finally, we conclude the paper in §7.
2 THREAT MODEL
Figure 2 presents our threat model of component hijacking on
Android. The adversary is a caller app, and the victim is a callee app
that contains a component that is exported. The attack component
in the caller app sends a crafted IPC (inter-process communication)2
request to the exported component to maliciously trigger its code
execution for a privileged operation, e.g., permission misuse [33]
and data manipulation [40]. In this sense, component hijacking
belongs to the classic confused deputy problem [34]. Note that
although Figure 2 shows only two parties, our defense can handle
hijacking via one or multiple middle app(s).
More specifically, we underline two in-scope threats that are not
considered in some related works.
• Unlike some existing work [33, 64], we do not assume
that exported components protected with above-normal
permissions [14] are always safe. We do not consider it
safe because for an exported component protected with a
dangerous-level permission, an attack app can still register
the corresponding permission for sending IPC requests. Ad-
ditionally, a recent report [6] showed that even components
with a signature-level permission could be compromised,
because the attack app can pre-claim that permission as
normal if it is installed earlier than the victim app.
2A.k.a. ICC (inter-component communication) [47].
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• Similarly, for the attack app, we do not assume that it
always has zero or few permissions since it can claim the
same permission as the misused permission in a victim app.
The benefit for doing so is that it may deceive the IPC call
chain-based permission checking [27, 31]. We do assume
that the attack app has no root privilege though.
It is worth noting that a related threat called unauthorized Intent
receipt [24] is out of the scope of this paper. This threat is essen-
tially different from component hijacking. In its model, the attack
app is the callee, and exploit occurs because the caller victim app
mistakenly sends out sensitive information in its IPC messages. A
systematic defense [44] has been proposed to mitigate this issue.
Additionally, we do not consider that the host app would break
the integrity of SCLib or its policies. This is reasonable because our
objective is to protect potentially vulnerable apps instead of the
malicious apps. Similarly, the malicious app colluding [41] is also
out of our scope.
3 OBJECTIVES AND RELATEDWORKS
3.1 Design Objectives
To defend against component hijacking in the wild, we identify the
following four objectives:
O1 No firmware modification. The approach does not rely
on firmware customization. It should also work without
the root privilege.
O2 No app repackaging. The approach does not repackage
target apps in bytecode or binary rewriting [39, 63].
O3 Handling all four types of components. The proposed
solution shall protect all four types of Android compo-
nents, including Intent-based components (i.e., Activity,
Service, and Receiver) and non-Intent based components
(i.e., Provider). Note that in this paper, we simplify Broad-
castReceiver and ContentProvider as Receiver and Provider,
respectively.
O4 Minimal impact on normal operations. The solution
has minimal performance impact on normal app function-
ality and intra-app communication.
3.2 Analysis of Existing Solutions
We now analyze how existing solutions defend against component
hijacking and the extent to which they achieve the aforementioned
four objectives. Table 1 summarizes our analysis on major defenses
against component hijacking.
First, most existing defenses require firmware modification (O1:
✗). This includes Saint [48] for adding install- and run-time policies
that require developers to specify, IPC Inspection [31], Quire [27],
TrustDroid [21], Scippa [16], Bugiel et al. [20] for using system-
wide reference monitors to check inter-component call chains to
prevent privilege (mainly permissions [33]) escalation, and Kantola
et al. [38] for inferring and restricting unintentional component
exposure. More recently, IEM [61] extends the Android framework
to enable user-layer Intent firewall apps. There are other related
approaches (e.g., [17, 22, 35, 43, 52]) in this category, though they
were not specialized for defending against component hijacking.
All these prior works take advantage of the open-sourced nature
of Android to make code changes and provide more secure OS
Table 1: A comparison ofmajor defenses against component
hijacking.
Core Idea Objectives (see §3.1)O1 O2 O3 O4
Saint [48] Adding install- and run-time policies ✗ ✔ H# ✗
IPC Inspection [31] Checking IPC call chains ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗
Quire [27] Checking IPC and RPC call chains ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗
TrustDroid [21] Mediating IPC in middleware layer ✗ ✔ H# ✗
Bugiel et al. [20] Mediating IPC in different layers ✗ ✔ H# ✗
Aurasium [59] Intercepting sensitive API calls ✔ ✗ H# H#
Kantola et al. [38] Restricting component exposure ✗ ✔ ✗ ✔
IntentFirewall [1] A system-layer firewall to check Intents H# ✔ ✗ ✗
AppSealer [62] Flow checking of incoming Intents ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗
Scippa [16] Building system-centric IPC call chains ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗
IEM [61] Enabling user-layer Intent firewall apps ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗
✔= applies; H#= partially applies; ✗= does not apply.
design principles, but in the real world, they were not adopted by
smartphone vendors. Additionally, end users have no capability to
flash the modified firmware in general.
A particularly interesting example is IntentFirewall [1]. Although
it was introduced into the Android Open Source Project (AOSP)
repository over four years ago, it is still experimental and not an of-
ficially supported feature of the Android framework [60], probably
due to its limitations [60]. The SEAndroid community is exploring
the idea of using IntentFirewall as a potential replacement of their
experimental Intent MAC mechanism [10], because in the original
form of SEAndroid [51], it does not audit app-layer IPC. SEAndroid
tries to reconstruct Android’s sandbox from the previous Linux UID-
based discretionary access control to the present SELinux-confined
mandatory access control. It can restrict certain app flaws such as
direct file leak [51] but not component hijacking or indirect file
leak [54, 55], because it is challenging to efficiently audit every IPC
at the system level without affecting normal app functionality. Even
if one day a solid Intent MAC might be activated, it still faces the
deployment challenges to protect fragmented and outdated devices.
Second, other defenses typically need to perform app repackag-
ing (O2: ✗). Aurasium [59] and AppSealer [62] are the two notable
examples. Specifically, Aurasium repackages apps to insert API
hooking code to intercept sensitive API calls. It mainly aims to
prevent malware but can also be used to mitigate component hi-
jacking in which sensitive APIs (in a victim app) are triggered by an
attack app. On the other hand, AppSealer is specialized to generate
patched apps that introduce flow tracking to avoid critical APIs
being triggered by malicious Intents. Both approaches are attractive
from the security’s perspective, but they also face the deployment
difficulties: (i) repackaging is unlikely adopted by app developers
because they own the source code and do not want repackaging to
affect the original code quality; (ii) app stores are unlikely to de-
ploy repackaging-based approaches because they (including Google
Play) have no access to the developers’ private signing keys.
Third, none of the prior efforts has fully handled all four types
of components (O3: ✗; O3:H#). Most of them only protect the Intent-
based components, whereas the non-Intent based Provider compo-
nent is largely under-treated. Although all underlying Android IPC
communications go through the Binder driver [37, 50], Intent and
Provider are two different higher-level abstractions of Binder [32].
Existing approaches either just modify the Android framework to
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supervise Intent IPC (e.g., [27, 31]), or only recover Intents’ seman-
tic from the kernel-layer Binder (e.g., [16, 20]). Approaches such as
AppSealer [62] and IEM [61] also explicitly target at Intent-based
components. Note that although some approaches (e.g., [21, 48])
mentioned the protection for Provider to some extent, the generic
and broader app Provider vulnerabilities [64] were not touched be-
cause the problem itself was discovered only afterwards. Probably
for the same reason, existing solutions focus only on permission
misuse and data manipulation, yet the content leak and pollution
problem in Provider has to rely on Android’s updates.
Fourth, nearly no defenses satisfy the requirement of minimal
checking on normal operations (O4: ✗). Except the work from Kan-
tola et al. [38], firmware modification approaches have to monitor
all IPC communications in all apps within the system. Although
they achieve the whole-system coverage, the performance was sac-
rificed by not focusing on apps or components that need protection.
Moreover, they often need to retrieve the corresponding permis-
sion for each call chain, which also increases the overhead. On
the other hand, Intent flow based repackaging approaches such
as AppSealer [62] can concentrate on protecting risky app com-
ponents, but its data flow tracking is expensive. Hooking-based
API checking in Aurasium [59] is lightweight; however, it does not
differentiate sensitive API calls resulting from user operations or
malicious IPC.
Lastly, as orthogonal to the defense research, many prior stud-
ies try to understand and detect component hijacking issues in
real-world apps. They have leveraged program analysis techniques
to propose various detectionmechanisms, including ComDroid [24],
Woodpecker [33], CHEX [40], DroidChecker [23], ContentScope [64],
Epicc [47], ECVDetector [58], WeChecker [25], and DIALDroid [19].
Android app analysis frameworks, such as FlowDroid [15] and
Amandroid [53], could also be extended to analyze component
hijacking. Recently, more solid and scalable inter-component anal-
ysis methods [45, 46] and an Intent policy checking system called
IntentScope [36] are proposed.
4 SCLIB: SECURE COMPONENT LIBRARY
This section covers the design and implementation details of SCLib.
We begin with an overview of SCLib and some challenges in its
design in §4.1, and then present some important MAC policies
that SCLib is capable of enforcing (§4.2). After that, we discuss the
detailed implementation of SCLib with focus on our novel ways of
handling the challenges.
4.1 Design Overview
In this subsection, we first show a big picture of SCLib, and then
highlight the major challenges in designing and implementing
SCLib.
Figure 3 presents the overall design of SCLib. At the high-level
view, SCLib is a regular user-space library that could be easily inte-
grated into apps on different Android platforms. SCLib aims to be a
secure component library that performs in-app mandatory access
control (MAC) on behalf of app components to defend against com-
ponent hijacking. With a set of pre-defined MAC policies in SCLib,
developers can overcome the by-default system weaknesses and
commonmistakes. Moreover, due to the library-based nature, SCLib
SCLib 
Risky component 
Incoming IPC flow 
Adding Stub Codes in 
Entry Functions (Step 2) 
Enforcing In-App  
Access Control (Step 4) 
Compiling-time Phase Run-time Phase 
2 1 
Victim 
app 
3 4 
Rest of code 
Intercepted  IPC flow 
AC Decision 
Identifying Risky 
Components (Step 1) 
Extracting Enforcement  
Primitives (Step 3) 
Entry functions SCLib’s stub codes 
Figure 3: A high-level overview of SCLib.
inherently requires no firmware modification or app repackaging
(O1:✔; O2:✔).
Using SCLib consists of two phases, i.e., the compile- and run-
time phase as shown in Figure 3. Firstly in the compile-time phase,
developers include SCLib into their app projects and run our tool
suite to help SCLib identify risky components that need protection.
Then limited amounts of stub codes are added into entry functions
of risky components (usually two LOC per entry) so that SCLib can
intercept incoming IPC flows. Note that the whole procedure could
be automatic with just a run of our tool suite.
In the run-time phase, SCLib automatically collects enforcement
primitives and enforces policy checking without developers’ in-
volvement. Considering that SCLib’s checking is conducted only
at entry points and only for risky components, it makes SCLib
lightweight (O4:✔). With SCLib, the incoming IPC flow no longer
directly executes the component codes. Instead, it has to first go
through SCLib’s checking that could generate three possible out-
puts: deny, alert, and allow. Only in the allow case will the ex-
ecution flow go back to the component code immediately. In the
case of alert, SCLib pops up an alert dialog for users to make a
decision — flow resumes if the users choose to allow the call. If
SCLib determines to deny to call, control will return to the calling
environment immediately.
To make practical in-app policies to facilitate the access control,
SCLib collects a number of enforcement primitives that previous
efforts have not fully leveraged and takes all four types of Android
components into consideration (O3: ✔). To achieve these objec-
tives, we face the following major challenges in designing and
implementing SCLib:
C1 It is challenging to design in-app policies in our context, an
effort that had never been attempted before. Specifically, we
need to cover all four types of components and mitigate
attacks originated from both system weaknesses and com-
mon developer mistakes. Our design is further restricted by
the fact that the policies are enforced only at entry points
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Table 2: MAC policies in SCLib. Here are the six representative policies (P1 to P6) we have designed.
ID Policy Name † Policy Representation ‡
P1 No By-default Exported Provider P if IDa , IDv ∧ ¬ExportedAttr : deny H#
P2 No Pre-claimed Custom Permission All if IDa , IDv ∧ ∃(PermAttrv < SysPerms) ∧ PermAttrv = PermAttra : deny H#
P3 Alerting Implicitly Exported A, S, R if IDa , IDv ∧ ¬ExportedAttr ∧ ActionAttr < SysActions : alert ✔Components with Custom Action
P4 Alerting Explicitly Exported Provider P if IDa , IDv ∧ ExportedAttr = true: alert ✗
P5 Checking System-only Broadcasts R if IDa , IDv ∧ ∃(ActionAttr ∈ SysActions) ∧ InputAction , ActionAttr : deny ✔
P6 Filtering Sql Injection for Provider P if IDa , IDv ∧ ∃(AttackStr ∈ InputPara): deny ✗
† lists which components this policy is applicable to. All: all four components; A: Activity; S: Service; R: Receiver; and P: Provider.
‡ indicates whether a policy has been covered by previous efforts. ✔= covers by [38]; ✗= does not cover; H#= partially covers by system
updates. Note that [38] simply un-exports implicitly exported components in policy P3, which would cause incompatibility issues while
ours will not.
without additional run-time execution information. Fortu-
nately, as we are going to present in §4.2, it is feasible to
achieve a set of such in-app policies.
C2 Android fails to provide the caller identity information to
most of callee components except Provider and Service’s
Binder interface functions. Although there is an API called
Binder.getCallingUID() for this purpose, it only works
in the Binder thread [16] in which most components’ entry
functions do not run. Moreover, as an application-layer
defense, SCLib cannot modify the Android OS to address
this limitation, as opposed to Scippa [16]. However, the
caller identity is essential to the effectiveness of SCLib,
which demands a solution for this challenge.
C3 It is nearly infeasible to pop up alert dialogs in the intercepted
components, because those entry functions lack appropriate
user interface context and impose limited function return
timing thresholds. In §4.5, we will elaborate on this in more
detail and how we overcome it by a dialog-like Activity
transition technique.
C4 We do not have API support to collect certain component
attributes, though most of component attributes can be re-
trieved through existing APIs. For example, Android simply
reports true for all exported cases, no matter if it’s explic-
itly or implicitly exported. To obtain the raw exported
value, SCLib performs run-time manifest analysis by itself,
as shown in §4.6 later.
4.2 In-app MAC Policy Design
It is important to understand the policies SCLib is designed to en-
force before we present other details. Remember that our objective
is to have mandatory access control (MAC) policies to stop common
component hijacking issues that result from system flaws or devel-
oper mistakes. Table 2 lists six representative MAC policies (P1 to
P6) we have designed. From a high-level view, policies P1 and P2
patch the system weaknesses, P3 to P5 mitigate common developer
mistakes, and P6 filters a common attack. Note that we do not claim
that they cover all hijacking issues; instead, our purpose is to show
how to design in-app SCLib policies for major categories of attacks
and for different components. Our policies thus serve as templates
or baselines for more enhanced or customized policies. Researchers
can easily make other policies as we will demonstrate below.
Before going to the policy details, we first introduce the symbols
used in these policies. We denote each attribute as XxxAttr , such
as ExportedAttr for the exported attribute, PermAttr for the permis-
sion attribute, and ActionAttr for the Intent actions registered by
components. Additionally, there are a number of system-defined
permissions and actions, which we denote as SysPerms [11] and
SysActions [5], respectively. If a permission can be used only by
system or an action can be sent only by system, we further denote
them as SysOnlyPerm and SysOnlyAction, respectively. In addition,
we denote each input data as InputXxx. For example, the incom-
ing Intent action is represented as InputAction and the data Uri is
denoted as InputUri.
Trusting intra-app IPC by default. A common point among
all six policies is that we consider the IPC calls initiated from the
same app/developer trusted. That is, only an external IPC call from
a third-party app will be checked, i.e., IDa , IDv . This by-default
rule is important in two aspects. First, it effectively minimizes the
usability issues for normal user operations, because only the exter-
nal IPC for certain exported components (i.e., risky components, as
we will present in §4.3) will trigger the alerts. Second, it strengthens
SCLib’s access control capabilities because another app from the
same developer now can be trusted through the app identity and
its developer certificate checking. In contrast, solutions such as
IntraComDroid [38] and Android Lint simply stop all incoming IPC
calls, including those from the same developer, by un-exporting
components.
However, if the victim app contains a “middle” component that
allows an experienced adversary to detour external IPC requests
first to that middle component, our policy for trusting intra-app
IPC could be bypassed. Although it’s unusual for the victim app to
have this middle-component problem, we still can mitigate it by
adding a flag into each IPC relay so that SCLib can infer the origin
of an IPC call chain. For example, we can add one line of code,
intent.putExtra(‘sclibflag’, ‘outside’), into the Intents
from outside. We leave how to robustly address this issue to our
future work. In this paper, SCLib takes the default setting that trusts
all intra-app IPC.
Fixing system weaknesses with P1 and P2. We now show
how to design SCLib policies to mitigate system flaws. To this
end, we design policies P1 and P2 to fix two major weaknesses in
Android. The first is that Android prior to 4.2 by default exports
all Provider components even if they do not claim the exported
attribute. This over-ambitious exposure rule led to thousands of vul-
nerable Provider components [64]. Although Google later disabled
it, there are still many by-default exported Provider components in
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apps compiled with old SDK according to recent studies [42, 57]. To
make the new rule available to all apps and all phones (including
those under 4.2), we design policy P1 to mimic the current system
rule at the app layer. Specifically, SCLib directly denies an external
IPC request to the callee Provider that does not claim the exported
attribute (¬ExportedAttr).
P2, on the other hand, fixes a more complicated and less-known
system flaw [6] where an attack app installed earlier can pre-claim
a custom permission in the victim app with the purpose of down-
grading its protection level, e.g., from signature to normal. Con-
sequently, the attack app can hijack a “private” component that was
originally protected with signature-level permissions. Based on
this root cause, policy P2 first determines whether there is a custom
permission defined in the callee component, i.e., ∃(PermAttrv <
SysPerms). If it exists, we further check whether or not it has been
pre-claimed by the caller app, i.e., PermAttrv = PermAttra . In prac-
tice, we can simplify policy P2 for the signature-level custom
permissions by leveraging the fact that an external IPC can come
only when the signature permission has been downgraded.
Preventing developer mistakes with P3 to P5. In this part,
we show that how SCLib prevents three common developer mis-
takes using policy P3 to P5. We first discuss policy P3 and P4 to
take care of developers who mistakenly export their components or
simply did not realize the threats from exported components. Specif-
ically, for policy P3, our insight is that if developers register custom
Intent actions for their implicitly exported components, very likely
they do not intend to export those components. While policy P4 is
based on themeasurement results in [42, 64] that many explicitly ex-
ported Provider components can also leak sensitive data. To prevent
these two types of mistakes, policy P4 checks ExportedAttr and pol-
icy P3 further checks the custom actions (ActionAttr < SysActions).
To reduce false positives, we choose the alert for policy P3 and
P4. Moreover, since custom actions and Provider components are
much less-called by inter-app IPC, we expect that our alert policies
would not disrupt user experience.
Then we have policy P5 to mitigate a developer mistake that
appears at the code level (instead of manifest). That is, a Receiver
component that registers system-only broadcasts is still hijack-able
if it does not check the incoming Intent action explicitly in the
code [58]. Our measurement of ten high-profile open source apps
in §5 shows that a couple of them made this mistake. To defend,
policy P5 automatically checks the input action (on behalf of callee
component) against the system-only action claimed in manifest,
i.e., ∃(ActionAttr ∈ SysAction) ∧ InputAction , ActionAttr .
We can devise more policies to prevent other mistakes. For ex-
ample, we can also mitigate the denial-of-service hijacking due to
missed null checks on IPC input. To stop such hijacking, we record
the app crash times corresponding to each caller app, and if it has
exceeded the threshold value (e.g., three times), SCLib then denies
further requests. We leave implementing such a policy as our future
work.
Stopping a common attack with P6. Finally, we propose pol-
icy P6 as a prominent example to show SCLib’s capability of stop-
ping common attacks. Specifically, policy P6 aims to filter SQL
injection for Provider. As demonstrated in [64], an attack app can
hijack a Provider component to inject malicious SQL statements.
For example, the adversary sets the projection parameter of the
query function as a special phase “* from private_table;”. As
these special inputs are different from normal queries, we use
keyword-based filtering (such as the expression like “xxx from
yyy;”) to stop them. Similarly, we can stop the directory traversal
attack [64] in openFile entry of Provider by leveraging some file
path patterns. Furthermore, we can devise alert policies to protect
permission-protected components to stop an adversary that claims
corresponding dangerous permissions, as we will conduct case
studies in §5.2.
4.3 Compile-time Designs
At compile-time, SCLib mainly identifies the risky components and
their entry functions in order to add stub code for policy checking
and enforcement.
Identifying risky components. In order to minimize the over-
head introduced by SCLib, we only add our checking to risky com-
ponents that are defined as
• An Activity component is risky if it is exported and regis-
ters custom Intent actions.
• A Service component is risky if it is (i) explicitly exported
with custom Intent actions; or (ii) implicitly exported.
• A Receiver component is risky if it is (i) explicitly exported
with custom/system-only Intent actions; or (ii) implicitly
exported.
• A Provider component is risky if it does not claim the
exported attribute being false.
Locating entry functions. After risky components are identified,
SCLib makes MAC policy decisions at the beginning of each call,
and therefore needs to identify entry functions of the IPC calls.
Table 3 characterizes the component entry functions that need to
be intercepted. They are organized by different component types
and IPC call APIs. Due to space limitation, we briefly explain these
entry functions in the reverse order of component types:
Provider : Identifying entry functions for Provider is straightfor-
ward, because there is a one-to-one mapping between each
caller API and entry function.
Receiver : There is only one entry for Receiver, namely the onReceive
callback function.
Service: There are two ways to call a Service component, either by
starting it via the startService API or by binding it via
the bindService API. The onStartCom- mand entry (in
the first case) operates in a way similar to the onReceive
function, whereas the onBind or onRebind entry (in the
second case) only returns a Binder object and has no fur-
ther sequential execution. Indeed, with the retrieved Binder
object, an adversary can invoke any IPC interface func-
tions [8, 9] that are pre-defined by the Binder object. These
custom interface functions thus become additional Service
entries. Additionally, onHandleIntent is the entry of the
subclass IntentService.
Activity: Similar to Service, the entry functions of Activity also
include onCreate and onStart. Moreover, onNewIntent
could be an additional entry.
Adding stub code. To route incoming IPC flows to SCLib for ac-
cess control, SCLib adds two lines of stub code into entry functions.
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Table 3: Component entry functions that need to be intercepted, characterized by component types and IPC caller APIs.
Component types IPC caller APIs† Interested entry functions†of IPC callee components
Activity Context.startActivity() onCreate(Bundle); onStart(); onNewIntent(Intent)
Activity.startActivityForResult()
Service Context.startService() onCreate(); onStartCommand()
‡; onHandleIntent(Intent)
Context.bindService() onCreate(); onBind(Intent); onRebind(Intent)
Receiver Context.sendBroadcast() onReceive(Context, Intent)
Context.sendOrderedBroadcast()
Provider
ContentResolver.query() query(Uri, String[], String, String[], String)
ContentResolver.insert() insert(Uri, ContentValues)
ContentResolver.bulkInsert() bulkInsert(Uri, ContentValues[])
ContentResolver.update() update(Uri, ContentValues, String, String[])
ContentResolver.delete() delete(Uri, String, String[])
ContentResolver.openFileDescriptor() openFile(Uri, String)
† For simplicity, we skip the parameters of caller APIs and the class names of entry functions.
‡ An old-SDK version of onStartCommand(Intent, int, int) is onStart(Intent, int), which should be also covered.
Listing 1 demonstrates how we instrument Activity’s onCreate
function. Instrumenting other components’ entry functions is gen-
erally similar or could be even easier. For example, we instru-
ment Receiver’s onReceive via SecReceiver.receive(context,
intent), and handle Provider’s query by intercepting all its pa-
rameters plus a this variable for Context.
Listing 1: Instrumenting Activity’s onCreate, with the addi-
tional getIntent() and finish() API calls.
1 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedState) {
2 super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
3 + if (! SecActivity.onCreate(this , getIntent ()))
4 + { finish (); return; }
5 // Original code
6 }
A special case is how we handle bound services that own Binder
interface functions. As mentioned above, we shall treat those inter-
faces as individual entries. Therefore, for a bound Service such as the
RemoteService [8] (see its code at http://tinyurl.com/getpidentry),
we instrument not only its onBind as usual, but also its getPid in-
terface in a way similar to how we instrument Provider’s entries.
Specifically, we record both the interface name (“getPid”) and all
its parameters (null in this case).
4.4 Recovering Caller Identity via the Binder
Side Channel
Having discussed the policies that SCLib is designed to enforce, we
now turn to some implementation details to show how SCLib man-
aged to overcome the design challenges. In this specific subsection,
we show how SCLib recovers the caller identify (C2) via the Binder
side channel at the path of /sys/kernel/debug/binder/transac
tion_log. More specifically, for each risky IPC call intercepted, we
retrieve the recent Binder logs from this side channel and analyze
them to recover the corresponding caller app identity. Figure 4
shows a transaction_log example when an attack app exploits
an Activity component in the victim app. Each Binder log starts
with a unique transaction ID followed by the Binder action and
the process/thread IDs of the caller and callee processes. The last
part, node information, is not important — so we skip here. Note
that in the kernel-layer Binder driver, app processes do not directly
······
177341: call  from 7569:7590 to 173 :0 node 176320 handle 17 size 156:4
177342: reply from 173:1462 to 597:624 node 0 handle -1 size 0:0
177343: async from 173:475 to 597:0 node 857 handle 2 size 68:0
177344: reply from 173:310 to 7569:7590 node 0 handle -1 size 20:0
177345: call  from 6767:6767 to 597 :0 node 4298 handle 1 size 84:4
177346: reply from 597:1277 to 6767:6767 node 0 handle -1 size 24:4
······
(attack app) (/system/bin/surfaceflinger)
(victim app) (system_server)
ID          Action   PID (process id):TID (thread id)     Node (not important)
Figure 4: An example of the Binder transaction_log.
interact with each other. Instead, the high-level IPC always in-
volves a number of interactions between apps and system processes
(see [16] for more details). For example, the attack app (PID: 7569)
and the victim app (PID: 6767) here leverage the surfaceflinger
and system_server processes to delegate their communication.
Our extensive tests of Binder logs in different components show
that they all follow the same pattern, based on which we propose a
simple yet effective algorithm to recover caller identities. We still
use Figure 4 to illustrate this algorithm. The first step is to locate
the Binder log that “calls from” the callee PID for the first time,
i.e., the transaction 177345. Then we trace back to identify the first
app process, i.e., PID 7569, which is the caller app we are looking
for. Since there is no fixed PID pattern for non-system processes,
we further extract the corresponding UID and package name for
analysis. More specifically, if the UID is smaller than 10000 or if the
package name is a system binary, it must be a system process.
Since there is a timing window to retrieve the recent Binder logs,
SCLib performs the Binder analysis before othermodules. To further
decrease the delay, we focus on extracting and saving the logs first,
and postpone the actual analysis. Our tests show that in this way, we
can reliably retrieve the required Binder logs. Moreover, we found
that accessing the Binder transaction log is allowed even in some
smartphones with SEAndroid. We tested more than ten Android
device models and found that the majority of them allow the access
in the SEAndroid enforcing mode, including Samsung Galaxy S6
Edge+, Nexus 4/5/5X/6P, and several Huawei/Samsung/XiaoMi
phones.
7
4.5 Popping Up Alerts via the Dialog-like
Activity Transition
To enforce the alert policies, SCLib needs to pop up an alert dialog
for users to choose “allow” or “deny”. However, this is a challenging
task due to the following reasons:
• Background components such as Provider and Service do
not have an appropriate UI Context to display alert di-
alogs. Even for Activity, it cannot pop up dialogs when
onCreate() is still being intercepted, (i.e., not return yet).
• Some components’ entry functions (e.g., Activity’s onCreate()
and Receiver’s onReceive()) need to return in a short time.
Therefore, we cannot hold on the execution of these func-
tions and wait for users’ decisions.
To address these issues, we opt for a different strategy instead
of directly displaying an alert dialog. The basic idea is to launch
a dialog-like Activity from the intercepted component via the
startActivity() API. For entry functions that are sensitive to
execution time, SCLib immediately returns the execution flow to
them by assuming users choosing “deny”. If users select “allow”
later, SCLib re-sends the same Intent3 content on behalf of the
original caller app. Since the callee app has no way to distinguish
the caller identity, the original execution flow can resume. While
for other time-insensitive entry functions, SCLib can pause their
component execution and wait for users to make a decision on the
alert dialog.
To implement this dialog-like Activity transition approach, we
identify and handle the following technical issues:
• To enable background components to be able to launch the
alert Activity, we set a special Intent flag called FLAG_ACTI
VITY_NEW_TASK.
• After users click “allow” or “deny”, we automatically return
to the original UI state. This is important for maintaining a
good user experience. To do so, we set one more Intent flag
called FLAG_ACTIVITY_MULTIPLE_TASK so that our alert
Activity can naturally go back to the previous UI state after
calling Activity.finish().
• To avoid alert dialogs appearing in the history of recent
Activity components, we set the third Intent flag called
FLAG_ACTIVITY_EXCLUDE_FROM_RECENTS.
• To pause the component execution and wait for user deci-
sions, SCLib initializes a lock object and sets this object into
the “wait” status after invoking startActivity(). Once
users click the buttons, the alert Activity will notify the
“waited” lock object to be released. Then, the lock object
will stop waiting and the paused component will resume
its execution. To avoid unnecessarily long waiting, we set
a timeout value of 30 seconds in our prototype.
4.6 Extracting Component Attributes by
Run-time Manifest Analysis
To overcome challenge C4 that we do not have API support to
collect certain component attributes, SCLib performs Android man-
ifest analysis by itself. In particular, we choose the run-time analysis
3Provider’s entry functions are not sensitive to execution time, so we focus
on Intent-based communications here.
instead of compile-time analysis because it does not bother develop-
ers and neither needs the additional file storage. Also, it is immune
to app updates and can handle new components well.
The basic procedure is to dynamically retrieve and parse Android
Manifest.xml of the callee app. Specifically, for the callee com-
ponent, we extract its raw exported status, the registered Intent
actions, and the associated permissions. We then correlate the app
permission entries to obtain their protection levels and determine
whether an associated permission is defined by the system or the
callee. We also build a list of system-defined and system-only Intent
actions based on the Stowaway result [29] and Android source code
so that we can determine whether a given component listens to
system Intent actions or not.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate SCLib in three aspects. Firstly in §5.1, we
measure the component statistics of ten high-profile open source
apps to find out how many risky components could benefit from
SCLib and how much code footprint SCLib introduces. Then in
§5.2, we assess the security effectiveness of SCLib against attacks in
different components. Finally in §5.3, we measure the performance
overhead of SCLib under different scenarios.
5.1 Applying SCLib
We first get an idea about the extent to which typical Android apps
export their components to others, and the corresponding code
footprint when we apply SCLib to protect these components. To
this end, we collect the latest source code of ten high-profile open
source apps from their GitHub sites at the time of our research
(November 2016). Note that since the intended users of SCLib are
developers who own codes, SCLib is not only applicable to open
source apps but also regular apps on Google Play.
We summarize the statistics of ten tested apps in Table 4. The
majority of them are popular, with millions of downloads according
to Google Play, and the development of most apps have been lasting
for over five years. Furthermore, several of them claim to be highly
secure, including the very popular Telegram, K-9 Mail, and Signal
Private Messenger. Additionally, although Zirco Browser only has
around 100K installs, it is used by several other browser apps (e.g.,
org.easyweb.browser with 1M–5M installs) as a baseline.
We then run SCLib’s scripts to automatically measure the ex-
ported and risky components as well as their custom permissions.
The measurement results are also shown in Table 4, classified by
different component types. We find that every tested app exports
some of its components, and 67.3% of the exported components
are implicitly exported. Moreover, a large portion of the exported
components are potentially risky, which yield a total of 35 risky
components that require SCLib’s protection. Furthermore, we find
that five apps define their own custom permissions for their com-
ponents, which makes them potential victims to the permission
pre-occupy attack (see policy P2 in §4.2).
We further measure the additional stub code introduced by SCLib.
Specifically, we calculate the number of additional lines of code
based on the type of risky component and the number of entry
functions of that type. The results in Table 5 show that the code
footprint introduced by SCLib is negligible at less than 0.3% in all
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Table 4: Detailed statistics of ten high-profile open source applications.
Application Installs Version Start date # ofActivity†
# of
Service†
# of
Receiver†
# of
Provider†
# of
custom
permissions
# of
components
with custom
permissions‡
# of
risky
components‡
Telegram 100M - 500M 3.13.1 Oct, 2013 (1,2)/6 (4,1)/9 (0,4)/10 (0,0)/1 0 0,1,0,0 0,1,4,0
Zxing Barcode 100M - 500M 4.7.7 Oct, 2011 (0,4)/9 (0,0)/0 (0,0)/0 (0,0)/0 0 0,0,0,0 4,0,0,0
Terminal Emulator 10M - 50M 1.0.70 before 2010 (1,5)/8 (0,1)/1 (0,0)/0 (0,0)/0 3 1,0,0,0 3,1,0,0
K-9 Mail 5M - 10M 5.010 before 2010 (0,7)/27 (0,0)/7 (0,4)/5 (2,0)/4 4 0,1,1,2 1,0,4,2
WordPress 5M - 10M 5.9 Feb, 2012 (0,10)/53 (0,0)/15 (1,2)/5 (0,0)/1 1(S) 0,0,0,0 1,0,2,0
Signal Messenger 1M - 5M 3.20.4 May, 2010 (1,4)/37 (3,0)/8 (5,5)/12 (0,0)/2 2(S) 0,0,0,0 0,0,5,0
Wire 1M - 5M 2.19.289 Dec, 2014 (0,1)/5 (2,0)/2 (0,1)/1 (0,0)/0 0 0,0,0,0 0,0,1,0
Bitcoin Wallet 1M - 5M 5.0 Mar, 2011 (1,2)/11 (0,0)/4 (0,2)/2 (0,0)/3 0 0,0,0,0 0,0,2,0
ChatSecure 0.5M - 1M 14.2.3 Feb, 2011 (0,2)/25 (0,0)/5 (2,0)/2 (0,0)/1 3 0,1,0,1 1,0,0,0
Zirco Browser 50K - 100K 0.4.4 Jun, 2010 (0,1)/17 (0,0)/0 (0,1)/1 (0,2)/2 0 0,0,0,0 0,0,1,2
† (x,y)/z in column 5, 6, 7, and 8 means the app has a total of z components of the type, among which x are explicitly exported and y are implicitly exported. The
rest are non-exported.
‡ The data format in column 10 and 11, a,b,c,d, follows the order of Activity, Service, Receiver, and Provider.
(S) The number with the (S) mark in column 9 indicates signature-level permissions. The other permissions in this column are at the dangerous level.
Table 5: Size of stub code to protect risky components.
Application Lines ofJava codes
Lines of
stub codes
Extra code
percentage
Telegram 222,074 32 0.014%
Zxing Barcode 43,221 24 0.056%
Terminal Emulator 11,507 30 0.261%
K-9 Mail 51,416 62 0.121%
WordPress 81,076 22 0.027%
Signal Messenger 63,137 34 0.054%
Wire 52,808 2 0.004%
Bitcoin Wallet 18,695 40 0.214%
ChatSecure 36,911 18 0.049%
Zirco Browser 9,638 26 0.270%
cases. Note that since SCLib is implemented in Java and will be
instrumented in Java environments, we only compare our code
footprint based on the number of lines of Java code in each apps,
though some tested apps also contain many C/C++ codes. Addi-
tionally, the jar file of SCLib itself is also very small — only around
30KB before compression.
5.2 Security Evaluation
To perform security evaluation, we identify eight vulnerable or
risky components from the aforementioned ten apps. As shown in
Table 6, these cases cover all four types of Android components and
all six policies we designed. We first implement two attack apps
for the Intent-based and Provider-based attacks, and verify that
such attacks work on the (original) vulnerable or risky components.
Our tests show that after including SCLib, the security-enhanced
components are no longer vulnerable to those attacks.
In the rest of this subsection, we present our detailed analysis of
the eight case studies to demonstrate SCLib’s unique values in miti-
gating developer mistakes and system weaknesses when compared
to developers’ own patches and Android platform updates.
Case 1: Fixing vulnerable componentswithout losing com-
patibility.The first case, Terminal Emulator (jackpal.androidterm),
is a good example to illustrate that the developers’ own patches
sometimes could cause incompatibility issues that SCLib can avoid.
Terminal Emulator contained a vulnerable component called Remote
Table 6: Security case studies: Using SCLib to protect vulner-
able/risky components.
ID Target Component (†) App Policy
1 RemoteInterface (A; I) Term Emulator P3 (alert)
2 MessageProvider (P; E) K-9 Mail P4 (alert)
3 RemoteControlReceiver (R; I) K-9 Mail P3 (alert)
4 TermService (S; I) Term Emulator P3 (alert)
5 ZircoBookmarksProvider (P; I) Zirco Browser P1 (deny)
6 New/Clear KeyReceiver (R; I) Signal P2 (deny)
7 AppStartReceiver (R; I) Telegram P5 (deny)
8 WeaveContentProvider (P; I) Zirco Browser P6 (deny)
† means Type; Export, i.e., the component type (four types of compo-
nents) and the export status (implicitly or explicitly exported).
Interface in its version 1.0.63. The component is implicitly ex-
ported and can be triggered by a crafted Intent to execute arbitrary
commands without any user interaction. To fix this vulnerabil-
ity, the developers removed the programmatic command execu-
tion functionality in RemoteInterface [3, 4]. However, there were
other apps4 that continue to utilize this programmatic interface
and the patch thus caused an incompatibility issue5 on those apps.
Additionally, simply un-exporting the component as proposed by
IntraComDroid [38] would cause the same incompatibility issue.
In contrast, SCLib fixes this vulnerability in a more elegant way
that results in no incompatibility issue and no additional developer
effort. Specifically, since RemoteInterface registers an Intent fil-
ter to take a custom Intent action, it satisfies our policy P3 (see
Table 2). As a result, SCLib pops up an alert dialog when an ex-
ternal app tries to trigger the programmatic command execution
in RemoteInterface. In this way, SCLib notifies users on poten-
tial attacks while keeping the app compatible with other legacy
apps (that call RemoteInterface). SCLib also saves the developers’
effort in making the patches — Terminal’s developers performed
around 200 lines of code changes to construct the patch [3].
4To name a few, see code snippets in https://goo.gl/HK3HgJ, https://goo.gl/
0t78J8, https://goo.gl/xPjlv3, and https://goo.gl/xOs5zN.
5A bug report was actually issued after the patch, but the developers of
Terminal closed all links after the project was finished.
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Case 2 & 3 & 4: Enforcing security beyond Android’s ex-
isting security mechanisms. In this part, we first present how
SCLib enhances protection of two risky components in K-9 Mail
(com.fsck.k9) — MessageProvider as in case 2 and RemoteControl
Receiver as in case 3. Both components are exported and have self-
defined dangerous-level permissions. The rationale behind this
design is that K-9 Mail has a number of extension apps [7] which
need to access these two components. To share components to other
apps with different signatures, the most secure way Android cur-
rently provides is to define a dangerous-level permission, as what
K-9 Mail did. However, this is too coarse-grained and cannot pre-
vent a malicious app from claiming the corresponding permissions
to steal users’ emails via MessageProvider. Indeed, according to
a comprehensive survey [30], users generally skip the permission
inspection during app installation or simply cannot understand the
permission meanings, which makes the attacks here realistic.
With SCLib, K-9Mail now can achieve a more fine-grained access
control by enabling users allow/deny a particular external app on
the alert dialog. K-9 Mail would not have been capable of achieving
such fine-grained security because: (i) Intent-based components
such as RemoteControlReceiver have no existing method of ob-
taining caller identity, an important primitive Android currently
fails to provide; and (ii) even though MessageProvider has an API
to extract the caller identity, it cannot pop up alert dialogs.
Further, TermService in case 4 demonstrates a clearer exam-
ple where developers actually demand the capability of differ-
entiating different caller app identities. According to its code at
http://tinyurl.com/termservice, we see that the developers want
to determine whether an external app or its own Activity makes
the incoming IPC. However, TermService tries to achieve this by
checking whether the incoming Intent contains a custom action
that is claimed in the <intent-filter>. Developers believe that an
external app would use that custom action to launch IPC, but actu-
ally an attack app can explicitly call TermService without setting
that action. Consequently, TermService’s action-based checking
can be bypassed. With SCLib, we can prevent such attacks and
provide developers a solid mechanism to differentiate external IPC
calls.
Case 5 & 6: Fixing system weaknesses with a broader plat-
form and app coverage. Next, we introduce two cases to illus-
trate that SCLib can fix system weaknesses with a broader platform
and app coverage than Android’s system updates. In case 5, Zirco
Browser (org.zirco)’s ZircoBookmarksProvider is by default ex-
ported by Android system, causing the leakage of users’ bookmarks.
Although Android changed this by-default policy since 4.2, the new
exposure policy is not applicable to apps with a target SDK version
below 4.2. In contrast, SCLib leverages the policy P1 to protect all
implicitly exported Provider components even when they run on
legacy phones or are compiled with target SDKs of older versions.
As another example, Signal PrivateMessenger (org.thoughtcrime.
securesms) contains two dynamically registered Receiver compo-
nents, NewKeyReceiver and ClearKeyReceiver, which are pro-
tected with a custom signature-level permission called ACCESS_
SECRETS. As explained in §4.2, they are subject to the permis-
sion pre-occupy attack. Android fixes this weakness only after 5.0,
whereas SCLib can eliminate its impact even on Android versions
prior to 5.0.
Case 7 & 8: Fixing common developer mistakes and stop-
ping common attack patterns. We now present case 7 and 8
to illustrate how SCLib helps fix a common developer mistake
and stop a common attack pattern, respectively. In case 7, Tele-
gram (org.telegram.messenger) defines an AppStartReceiver
component to listen to the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, but the
developers forgot to check this system-only action in its code
(see http://tinyurl.com/startreceiver), making it possible that the
component execution be triggered by any app. With SCLib, de-
velopers no longer need to worry about such checking because
SCLib automatically performs the checking based on policy P5. We
further mimic a SQL injection attack on WeaveContentProvider
in case 8, which can be defended by our policy P6, as shown in
http://tinyurl.com/sqlweave.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance overhead of SCLib under differ-
ent scenarios. Since we have already shown that the code footprint
SCLib introduces is very small (less than 0.3%, see §5.1), here we
focus our evaluation on the additional execution time SCLib intro-
duces.
Evaluation methodology. As the additional code SCLib intro-
duces is negligible, we expect that the resulting additional execution
time is also small. In such a case, an external profiling tool might in-
troduce too much noise and might be too coarse-grained in the time
measurement to give accurate results.We therefore choose to instru-
ment the source code of the subject apps and add time-measurement
code into them to have a fine-grained analysis of each module’s
overhead. We insert nanosecond-level System.nanoTime() timing
functions just before and after the code block of each module, the
sum of the readings of which will be the overall overhead of SCLib.
Experimental setup.We use a Nexus 4 phone to evaluate the
performance overhead. As some modules of SCLib may introduce
different overhead for Intent-based components and Provider (e.g.,
obtaining caller identity), we include both types of components
for our evaluation. More specifically, we use Terminal Emulator’s
RemoteInterface and Zirco Browser’s ZircoBookmarksProvider
as the evaluation subjects. In particular, we consider the over-
head of popping up alert dialogs as part of SecActivity’s over-
head, because it delays the presence of the original callee Activity
whereas the other three types of background components have no
such concern. Moreover, protecting Activity components gener-
ally uses the alert policies. For each app, we test 20 times and
report the average for normal IPC latency and the execution time
of each module in SCLib. Since startActivity() is an asynchro-
nous API, the normal IPC latency of an Activity is defined as the
latency from the time when startActivity() is called to the time
when the user interface is just to be displayed. For Provider, since
ContentResolver.query() is a synchronous API, we simply mea-
sure its execution time.
Result overview. Table 7 shows the performance results for
the tested Activity and Provider, respectively. We can see that the
cumulative overhead (i.e., the worst-scenario overhead) is below
5% for both components, with 4.42% for Activity and 3.71% for
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Table 7: Breakdown of SCLib’s overheads.
Scenario Category Time cost Overhead %
Activity
Original
scenario Normal IPC latency: t0 464.40ms -
Overheads
introduced
by SCLib
Binder analysis: t1 8.73ms 1.88%
Manifest analysis: t2 0.24ms† 0.05%†
Policy assessment: t3 0.05ms 0.01%
Popping up alerts: t4 11.53ms 2.48%
Sum (worst-scenario) 20.55ms 4.42%
Provider
Original
scenario Normal IPC latency: t0
′ 10.82ms -
Overheads
introduced
by SCLib
Getting caller identity: t1 ′ 0.24ms 2.22%
SQL filtering: t1.5 ′ 0.001ms 0.01%
Manifest analysis: t2 ′ 0.146ms† 1.35%†
Policy assessment: t3 ′ 0.014ms 0.13%
Sum (worst-scenario) 0.401ms 3.71%
† SCLib analyzes manifest only once for the entire lifecycle of the app.
In the Activity context, manifest analysis takes 2.41ms in the first run
and zero for the rest of runs. Similarly, the analysis of the first run on
Provider takes 1.46ms. Therefore, we calculate an estimated value by
assuming that there are ten IPC transactions in a lifecycle of the app.
Provider. Also, the absolute cumulative timing overhead is only
20.55ms and 0.4ms, which is unnoticeable to human users. Moreover,
we would like to underline that SCLib brings overheads only at the
entry points of risky components, while existing defenses cause
slowdown to the entire app or system.
Overhead breakdown.We further perform a breakdown analy-
sis of SCLib’s overheads in each module. As shown in Table 7, there
are five modules corresponding to the following four scenarios (S1
to S4):
S1 Overhead on intra-app communication: t1 or t1 ′. To nor-
mal intra-app communication, SCLib only introduces the
binder analysis overhead t1 or the overhead of getting the
caller identity in Provider t1 ′. Both are small at 1.88% and
2.22%, respectively.
S2 Overhead on SQL injection: t1 ′ + t1.5 ′. For Provider com-
ponents, SCLib needs to filter malicious SQL strings, but
such overhead is negligible (0.001ms only).
S3 Overhead on attacks that require manifest analysis and pol-
icy assessment: S1+t2/t2 ′+t3/t3 ′. SCLib performs manifest
analysis and policy assessment to stop hijacking attacks.
The additional delay introduced is also small at 0.29ms for
t2 + t3 and 0.16ms for t2 ′ + t3 ′.
S4 Overhead on attacks that trigger alert dialogs: S1 + S3 + t4.
Finally, in the worst scenario, SCLib introduces ∼10ms
additional delay (i.e., t4) to trigger the alert. This delays
the presence of the callee Activity.
6 DISCUSSION
We now discuss SCLib’s several limitations and potential improve-
ments to be made. Firstly, requiring a re-compilation of the Android
app (not a re-design of the software) is a limitation of SCLib. How-
ever, it is not only targeted to new apps but also existing ones,
since Android apps typically require frequent updates (Google Play
enforces mandatory app updates by default) and re-compilation
anyway. Secondly, as we have discussed in §4.2, SCLib currently
cannot handle hijacking via one or multiple middle component(s)
in the callee app. But for the middle-app problem, since SCLib only
needs to differentiate an external or an internal IPC in this scenario,
in principle SCLib can handle it. The only exception is that for
alert policies, an attack app may leverage the middle app’s iden-
tity to trick users into clicking the “allow” button. Thirdly, although
SCLib has minimized usability issues for most user operations by
trusting intra-app IPC (§4.2), its alert policies may still cause a few
usability issues. These could be further mitigated by the fact that
SCLib only needs to enforce policies on risky components (§4.3).
Since the percentage of risky components is small (see Table 4),
we expect the usability issues to be minimal. Moreover, we can
leverage the recent advance of user-driven access control [49] and
knowledge in the HCI field to further minimize its impact. Finally,
SCLib cannot protect third-party components of which developers
do not own source code (e.g., advertisement libraries); but library
providers can periodically push updates to enhance the security of
their components.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORKS
In this paper, we presented a practical and lightweight approach
called SCLib to defend against component hijacking in Android
apps. SCLib is essentially a secure component library that performs
in-app mandatory access control on behalf of app components. We
designed six mandatory policies for SCLib to stop attacks originated
from both system weaknesses and common developer mistakes.
We have implemented a proof-of-concept SCLib prototype and
demonstrated its efficacy and efficiency. In the future, we will try
to integrate SCLib into Boxify [18] after its code is released.
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